EDITORIAL by unknown
YALE LAW JOURNAL
Published monthly during the Academic Year by the Yale Law Journal Co., Inc.
Edited by Students and members of the Faculty of the Yale Law School.
SUBSCRIPTION PRICE, $4.60 A YEAR SINGLE COPIES, 80 CENTS


































The JOURNAL consistently aims to print matter which presents a view of merit on a subject de-
serving attention. Beyond this no collective responsibility is assumed for matter signed or unsigned.
CONTRIBUTORS OF LEADING ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE
GEORGE E. WOODBINE is a Professor in the Yale Law School.
JOHN R. CoMMoNs has been Professor of Economics in the University of
Wisconsin since 19o4. He was president of the American Economists' Associa-
tion in 1917. His published works include Labor Legislation (1916, with John B.
Andrews); Industrial Goodwill (1919) and Legal Foundations of Capitalism
0924).
W. E. SUMMEmS practiced law in Illinois from 1912 to 1915. He was formerly
Professor of Law in the University of Kentucky, and has held a similar position
in the University of Illinois since 192o.
ALIENABILITY OF INTERESTS IN LAND HELD ADVERSELY
Under the early common-law one whose land was in the adverse
possession of another could not transfer his interest in it to a third
person.' He was regarded as having "a right of entry and a right of
action." These were treated as purely "personal rights" and so, like
other "choses in action," non-assignable.? The common law rule 'was
done away with by statute in England in 1845. 3 Similar statutes exist
'Ames, Lectures on Legal History (1913) 174.
'Ames. op. cit. supra note I, at pp. 174, 21o.
(1845) 8 & 9 Vict. c. io6, sec. 6. See Jenkin v. Jones (1882, C. A.) L. R. 9
Q. B. Div. 128.
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in many American states,4 and in a number the courts refused, in the
absence of a statute, to follow the English rule.5 In perhaps a dozen
states, however, the common law view was adopted. 6 We must hasten
to add that these states in adopting the common law rule accepted with
it a device which to a large extent destroyed the rule except as one of
procedure. Treating the disseisee's interest as a "chose in action," the
courts applied to it the familiar doctrine that an assignment of the
"chose" carried with it a "power of attorney" to bring appropriate com-
mon law actions in the name of the assignor. This meant, in the case
of the disseisee, bringing an action of ejectment in the name of the
(disseisee) grantor.7  The present writer has elsewhere shown s that in
the case of an ordinary common law chose in action, such as a debt, the
result was that in the developed system of the common law in this
country9 the assignee became the legal as well as the equitable "owner"
of the "chose," except that before the debtor had notice of the assign-
ment the assignor retained a power to destroy the assignee's rights.
10
In this earlier discussion it was pointed out that much the same thing
'Ames, loc. cit. supra note I gives a list of these.
'Ames, ibid.
'Ames, ibid.
7 This led to the interesting result of an action with the double fiction of two
"nominal plaintiffs" and one "real plaintiff." Jackson v. Leggett (1831, N. Y.
Sup. Ct.) 7 Wend. 377.
'Cook, The Alienability of Choses in Action (i916) :29 HAav. L. REv. 8M6.
'This development was in general reached in the closing years of the eighteenth
and early years of the nineteenth century. These statements refer to the Ameri-
can law, not the English.
"0 "Rights" is here used- in the generic sense, including rights stricto sentsu.
(claims with correlative duties), privileges, powers and immunities. Attention
may perhaps be called to an unconscious misinterpretation of my position made
by Professor Williston in the course of our discussion in the HAovARD LAW
REvIEw. In The Word "Equitable" and its Application to the Assignment
of Choses in Action (1918) 31 HARV. L. REv. 822, at p. 827, he says: "What I
criticized, and still criticize, is that after having explained that the assignee,
prior to notice to the debtor, has not all the rights, privileges, powers, and
immunities of full ownership, he thereafter habitually calls the assignee owner
and possessed of the legal title, and gives the weight of his approval to the
equally ambiguous statements of others." As a matter of fact, that is just
what I refused to do. In my original discussion I said: "A word must be said
concerning the situation after assignment but before notice of it to the debtor.
Clearly here the assignor retains some of the powers of an owner-he can
extinguish the claim by release, accepting payment, etc. Such acts on his part,
of course, are wrongs against the assignee and render him liable to actions for
damages. Translating this into the terms of our analysis, we may say that the
assignor retains some of his legal powers but has lost his privileges as owner
of the chose, and the assignee is as yet only partly owner because he lacks the
immunities which are essential to complete ownership." The words in italics
were not so printed in the original article. See Clark and -utchins, The Real
Party in Interest (1925) 34 YALE LAw JouRNAL, 259, 260.
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could be said of the effects of this device upon the transferability of
interests in land held adversely."
New York is one of the states which adopted the common law view
that the disseisee's interest is non-transferable, and with it also the
device of the power of attorney.1 2  In the recent case of People v.
Ladew"s the Court of Appeals has been compelled to consider exactly
what, in its opinion, the relative interests of disseisor, disseisee, and
grantee of disseisee really are. A survey of the prior New York cases
reveals that in some respects the development in that state differs from
that in some other states adopting the common law view. A brief
review of the New York cases in comparison with those in other states
is therefore necessary in order to appreciate the problem presented to
the New York court.
In the case of the ordinary chose in action, the so-called "power of
attorney" to sue in the assignor's name was ultimately held to be irrevo-
cable, at law as well as in equity.' 4 In some states the same result was
reached in the case of the "power" of the grantee of a disseisee to use
his grantor's name in a common law action.' 5 The opposite result seems
to have been reached in New York in early cases which held that the
grantee could use the grantor's name only if the latter actually assented
at the time of the bringing of the action."6 The basis of this view was
the assumption that after the deed something called "the title" to the land
still remained in the grantor (dis seisee) ; from which assumption was
deduced the conclusion that the grantor, in spite of his deed, could
recover possession of the land by bringing ejectment against the dis-
seisor or other person and also forbid the grantee to do so, i.e., that he
could revoke the grantee's "power of attorney." 17  It was, however,
U Cook, op. cit. supra note "8, at p. 835.
"Webster v. Van Steenbergh (1864, N. Y. Sup. Ct) 46 Barb. 211; Pearce v.
Moore (889) 114 N. Y. 256.
" (1924) 237 N. Y. 413, 143 N. E. 238.
'This was of course not true in the early law, but had become so in the first
quarter of the nineteenth century. The cases are given in my discussion referred
to above, note 8. The additional "right" (legal relation) thus conferred upon
the assignee is an immunity, i.e., freedom from power on the part of the assignor
to destroy the assignee's rights.
'See Steeple v. Downing (1878) 6o Ind. 478, where the grantor gave the
defendant (disseisor) a power of attorney to dismiss the suit brought by the
grantee but labeled with the grantor's name. It was held that the grantor could
not thus control the action.
"Lowber v. Kelly (1862, N. Y. Super. Ct.) 9 Bosw. 494. The actual decision
in this case was that the grantee could not bring an equitable action in his own
name against the grantor (disseisee) and adverse possessor. The reasoning of
the court was based upon the rule as stated in the text, and apparently this was
regarded as settled law. The Court of Appeals appears never to have passed
upon the matter, but in People v. Ladew, supra note 13, the opinion of the
majority assumes the law to be as stated.
"' See the discussion of who may sue, etc., in Livingston v. Prosets (1842, N.
Y. Sup. Ct.) 2 Hill, 526.
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recognized that if the grantor did sue and recover a judgment for the
possession, his recovery would inure, not for his own benefit, but for
that of the grantee-an admission that ought to have led to an inquiry
as to just what was meant by saying that the grantor still had "title."
When the Code of Civil Procedure was adopted, requiring all actions
to be brought in the name of the real party in interest, the question was
raised as to whether the grantee was the "real party in interest" and so
could sue in his own name. To allow this would, of course, on its face
recognize the transferability of interests in land held under adverse
claim, in the teeth of the sfatute saying that such a grant was "void,""'
as well as of the statute making it a criminal offense to execute the deed
of transfer.19 As this could not be admitted, it was argued that no one
could sue, for, "if brought in the name of the grantee, he could, as
against the party in possession, show no title; for, as against such party
his deed was void. If brought in the name of the grantor, it might be
shown that he was not the real party in interest, because, if he recover,
his recovery would inure, not for his own benefit, but for the benefit
of the grantee.
'2 0
This discussion led to the passage in 1882 of an amendment2 ' to the
"real party in interest" section, then Section iii of the Code, by adding
the words: "But an action may be maintained by a grantee of land in
the name of the grantor, when the grant or grants are void by reason
of the actual possession of a person claiming under a title adverse to
that of the grantor at the time of the delivery of the grant, and the plain-
tiff shall be allowed to prove the facts to bring the case within this
provision."
Either as a result of this provision, or because of a change of view
on the part of the court, it seems to have been clearly recognized in the
subsequent cases in New York that the grantee no longer required the
permission of the grantor to use the grantor's name.22  But, still oper-
ating with the concept that "title" remained in the grantor, the New
York court held that the grantee had no "property right" which he could
pass on to a second grantee, and that therefore the latter could not sue,
even in the name of the original grantor.
2
Following out this same concept of the "title" as remaining in the
" See Chamberlain.v. Taylor (1883) 92 N. Y. 348.
" See Chamberlain v. Taylor, supra note 18.
"Woodruff, 3., in Hamilton v. Wright (i868) 37 N. Y. 502, 5o7, quoted in
Bliss, Code Pleading (3d ed. 1894) sec. 23a.
N. Y. Laws, 1862, ch. 46o, sec. 34.
' Hamilton v. Wright, supra note 2o; Smith v. Long (1882, N. Y.) 12 Abb.
N. C. 113.
'See Smith v. Long, supra note 22. It was also held that the grantor was
responsible for costs, Hamilton v. Wright, supra note 2o, on the ground that
the suit was really his. This same problem had greatly troubled the courts in
connection with the assignment of ordinary choses in action. The general trend
was towards recognizing the truth of the situation and placing the sole respon-
sibility for costs on the real plaintiff, the grantee, who alone could control the
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grantor, and that no "property right" passed to the grantee, the Court
of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, finally reached the extra-
ordinary result, in the case of Dever v. Haggerty,24 that if the grantor
later conveyed to the adverse possessor, although the latter knew of the
prior deed to the grantee, the deed passed the "title" to the adverse
possessor! The argument is, if one admits the premises, simple. In
the words of Werner, J.:
"The title remained in the graswtor, while the grantee took nothing
more than a right of entry which was merely a chose in action .....
This action [by the first grantee, but in the grantor's namel was not
brought until after the delivery and recording of the deed from the
plaintiff [i.e., the nominal plaintiff] to the defendant [the adverse
possessor]. What was the effect of this deed? The answer is obvious.
As the deed [to the real plaintiff] from the [nominal] plaintiff was void,
the title to the premises remained in the former [i.e., the nominal plain-
tiff, grantor of the real plaintiff]. The title was, therefore, in the
[nominal] plaintiff when she subsequently executed and delivered the
deed to Haggerty [the adverse possessor, present defendant]. That
deed conveyed the [nominal] plaintiff's title to the defendant
Haggerty."'5
Let us examine "the title" which the grantor is alleged to have had
after the first deed, and see whether before the second deed the grantor
really had all the rights which, it is now asserted, were merely trans-
ferred to the adverse possessor. Note that as between the grantee and the
defendant, the grantee could recover possession by bringing an action,
labelled, to be sure, with the grantor's name, but one which the grantor
could not forbid, and in which the judgment nominally in favor of the
grantor would inure to the grantee's benefit.26  Note also that he alone
would be responsible for the costs if judgment went in favor of the
defendant. The possession thus acquired, the grantee could of course
retain as against the grantor, as well as against third persons and the
disseisor.
It is obvious that any plausibility which the view taken in Dever v.
Haggerty may have is due to treating "the title" as some indivisible
unity which is always "somewhere," instead of considering it as a very
action. Some of the cases are collected in Cook, op. cit. supra note 8, at p. 833,
note 44- A subsequent amendment to the New York Code, N. Y. Laws, 1882,
ch. 399, sec. i, exempted the nominal plaintiff, the grantor, from costs and placed
them upon the real plaintiff, the grantee. The substance of these amendments
was carried over into sec. i5o of the later forms of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure, and is now found in sec. 994 of the Civil Practice Act
' (1902) i69 N. Y. 481, 62 N. E. 586.
Italics are the present writer's.
' Undoubtedly if the sheriff were to put the grantor into possession, his con-
duct would be tortious. His duty is to put the grantee into possession. This is
what is meant by saying that the "recovery by the grantor inures to the benefit
of the grantee." Note also that withholding possession by the disseisor from
the grantee entitled the latter to damages. Carey v. Lange (1912, 2d Dept.)
153 App. Div. 372, 138 N. Y. Supp. 555.
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complex aggregate of legal relations (rights (claims), privileges,
powers and immunities) which is not necessarily and in its totality
always vested in some one person. If the latter view is taken, it is at
once apparent that the grantor never had, after the disseisin, that totality
of legal relations commonly known as "title." Indeed, was it not the
common law view that all he had was a "chose in action," and not "the
title"?27 The interesting thing about the opinion in Dever v. Haggerty
is that, as the quotation above shows, the court expressly admits that a
"right of entry," a "chose in action," passed to the grantee. One may
well ask, then, what was this mysterious "title" which the grantor still
had? Was it the right to recover possession from the defendant?
Note that if the grantor brought the suit of his own motion, it was
universally admitted that any judgment he obtained would inure to the
grantee's benefit, not to that of the grantor. May we not, therefore,
'conclude that form is confused with substance in the opinion of
Andrews, J., in People v. Ladew, when he says:
"The grantee, therefore, might never bring an action in ejectment in
his own name.. He had obtained nothing-no title, no right of entry,
no chose in action of any kind. He had the bare right if his grantor
ever legally ousted him in adverse possession to claim by esfoppel the
benefit of that result."
To say that one who has effective legal remedies, which cannot be
denied him, to obtain possession from the adverse possessor and to
retain it as against his grantor, and all other persons, has' "obtained
nothing-no title, no right of entry, no chose in action of any kind" is
surely to close one's eyes to realities and to misstate the law. The result
in Dever v. Haggerty plainly was, therefore, to confer upon the grantor
a legal power to give to the disseisor rights which he, the grantor, did
not himself have. It thus enabled him to destroy rights which, accord-
ing to the prior decisions and the statutory provisions, were vested in
the grantee and otherwise irrevocable by the grantor. Such a result is
certainly out of line with the prior development of the law in connection
with ordinary choses in action, where the assignor could not, after notice
to the debtor, defeat the assignee's rights,28 as well as difficult to justify
on any grounds of policy if we once admit the soundness of the prior
cases and the code provisions which protect the grantee against
revocation.
We are now ready to examine the situation presented to the court in
People v. Ladew. The state claimed title to land under a person whose
"title" was derived from a grantor whose deed was executed and deliv-
ered while the land was in adverse possession, the deed to the state
'Compare the well-known rule that one disseised could not sue the disseisor
or third persons for acts done on the land subsequent to the disseisin without
first regaining possession. To be sure, on a realistic view these acts must have
been tortious (as against the disseisee) when done, or no recovery for them
could have been allowed after possession had been regained.
"Cook, op. cit. supra note 8, at p. 830.
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having also been made while the adverse possession continued. Admit-
tedly, one whose land was held adversely could make a valid grant to
the state, 29 so that had the original grantor deeded directly to the state
the latter would have acquired a valid claim. The question is thus
raised: Shall the rule laid down in the early cases, that the grantee of
land held adversely cannot give any rights to a second grantee who is
a private person, be extended to cover a grant to the state ?3  The
majority of the court, speaking through Andrews, J., answered the
question in the affirmative. The argument, as shown by the quotation
above, is, that the grantee got "nothing" by the grant and so could con-
vey 'nothing" to the state. It is not without interest to note that the
"right of entry," the "chose in action," which the court in Dever v.
Haggerty admitted was transferred to the grantee, has now dwindled
to "nothing."
In an illuminating opinion Cardozo, J., dissented. He demonstrates
very clearly that on the basis of the past decisions in New York the
grantee received by the grant a very substantial aggregate of rights, and
points out that the impression that this is not so is due to the technicali-
ties of an antiquated procedure. His refusal to apply to the state the
rule denying that the grantee can make a valid grant of his rights to a
private person is based upon the following argument: The policy which
originally led to the prohibition of the transfer of land held adversely,
whatever it may have been, 31 never applied to grants to the state directly
from the disseised person. For similar reasons, the rule forbidding the
grantee to transfer his rights, whatever they are, to a second grantee,
ought not to be extended to a case where the second grantee is the state.
The argument seems conclusive.
It would be difficult to find in the reported cases a clearer illustration
of the importance of equipping lawyers and judges with adequafe analy-
tical tools with which to work. For want of such an equipment, the
majority of the Court of Appeals seem to the present writer to have
reached a decision in an important case by means of an argument which
cannot stand the test of careful analysis, and one for which, in the light
of the policy established by past decisions, it is difficult to see any
justification.
W. W. C.
SERVICE OF PROCESS ON NONRESIDENTS IN ACTIONS IN PERSONALS[
The power of an American state through its courts to affect the legal
relations within that state of a nonresident becomes of concern under
the Fourteenth Amendment when sought to be manifested through
'Just as he could assign an ordinary chose in action to the state.
" The word "extended" is here used intentionally, for confessedly it had never
previously been decided that the grantee of a disseisee could not transfer his
rights to the state.
'Bordwell, Seisin and Disseisin (1921) 34 HARv. L. REV. 7,7, 734-36, dis-
cusses the pros and cons of the rule.
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state legislation.- In the absence of constitutional or statutory law,
Anglo-American courts at least have adopted rules as to the exercise of
jurisdiction2 to meet the exigencies of the moment; they have exercised
or declined to exercise the power to declare or change legal relations in
accordance with notions of policy. International law does not, it seems,
limit in any appreciable way a state in the international sense as to
what it can and may do within its own borders so far as the acquisition
or exercise of jurisdiction by its courts is concerned.3 Whether the
totality of judicial action by a state will have legal consequences attached
to it in other states raises a second and different question.4  It does not
always follow that where the second state has refused to "recognize,"
or attribute legal effect to, the judicial action of the first state, that the
latter was without "jurisdiction" and that the "judgment" is "void."5
I See infra note io. The question which generally arises is whether the statute
purporting to clothe the court with jurisdiction or to provide for service of
process over nonresidents is constitutional. A federal statute containing similar
provisions with respect to the federal courts might conceivably raise a similar
problem under the Fifth Amendment.
'Jurisdiction is the power to render a judgment or decree establishing or chang-
ing the legal relations of the litigants. "A court that renders judgment against a
defendant thereby tacitly asserts, if it does not do so expressly, that it has juris-
diction over that defendant." Holmes, J., in Chic. Life Ins. Co. v. Cherry (1917)
244 U. S. 25, 29, 37 Sup. Ct. 492, 493. See Cook, The Powers of Courts of Equity
(1915) 15 CoL. L. Rv. 37, io6 et seq.; cf. COmmENTS (1919) 28 YALE LAW
JOuRNAL, 579. Unfortunately, many courts and writers use the term "jurisdic-
tion" interchangeably in the sense of legal power and state, or territory. In
De [a Montanya v. De la Montanya (1896) 112 Calif. 131, 133, 44 Pac. 354, the
court said it did "not doubt that the mere presence of infants within a jurisdic-
tion is sufficient to confer jurisdiction, although they may be residents of another
state. But as such jurisdiction is always exercised for the good of the child, the
courts would never allow the power to be used for purposes of oppression, or to
prevent an infant temporarily within its jurisdiction from being taken away, when
its best interests required it, to its more permanent residence. The jurisdiction
is never used except when necessary for the good of the child."
'It is possible to assume a case under a system of international law where a
state would have the power to affect the legal relations within that state of a
nonresident and at the same time lack the privilege to do so. Where an inter-
national state is not fettered by a rule bf international law-apparently the situa-
tion to-day-it seems inaccurate to speak of "jurisdiction of a sovereign state."
A "sovereign" state in the "absolute" sense is not spoken of as having the legal
power to adjudicate, since its conduct is not dependent upon nor controlled by
any higher agency.
In the present discussion, unless otherwise indicated, the term "jurisdiction of
the court" and others substantially similar are used in the broad sense of "juris-
diction of the American state" and not in the narrow sense of the power which
the legislature of that state has conferred upon a particular court.
"The policy which has induced courts not to attach legal consequences to foreign
judicial action seems to have been carried over into the realm of American consti-
tutional'law. It is that policy which dictates that a "judgment" rendered not in
accordance with constitutional provisions (see infra notes iO, Ii) shall not be
given any legal effect even in the state of the forum.
So long as the courts of the forum give effect to the judicial action thus taken,
one cannot agree with Professor Beale that the judgment is no judgment at all.
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Many cases which speak of lack of jurisdiction simply show on close
analysis that the courts have been discretionary in the exercise of an
already existing jurisdiction; that it has not been exercised in many
instances because of some prevailing policy. The application of the
above analysis in considering the question of service of process on non-
residents it is believed can be very useful.
Since actual service of process is in most personal actions a necessary
fact without which the court will refuse to exercise jurisdiction with
respect to the controversy, it follows that lack of effective service will
necessarily result in the court's refusal to touch the legal relations within
the state of a nonresident. The older notion seems to have been that
potential physical control of the person whose legal relations were to
be affected was the basis of the exercise of jurisdiction. The require-
ment of service of process as a formal and technical institution is in
many of its phases a lingering survival of the notion.' That notion
See Beale, The Jurisdiction of a Sovereign State (1923) 36 HARV. L. REv. 241,
243, 244. The conclusion would follow if the action of the court were contrary
to international law or the municipal law of the forum. In the absence of such
legal inhibitions, the state of the forum, acting through its courts, will give effect
to the action of its own courts. In proper cases, the defendant, if present within
the state, will be liable to arrest and imprisonment, or his chattels can be seized
and sold. It is not believed that such action would constitute a casus belli.
'As already stated, a court has oftentimes spoken in terms of lack of jurisdic-
tion, although, in the absence of restraints of international or of municipal law,
the case has been simply one of refusal to exercise an already existing jurisdic-
tion. See the following expressions of Holmes, J.: "Ordinarily jurisdiction over
a person is based on the power of the sovereign asserting it to seize that person
and imprison him to await the sovereign's pleasure." Mich. Trust Co. v. Ferry
(1913) 228 U. S. 346, 353, 33 Sup. Ct. 550, 552. "The foundation of jurisdiction
is physical power. . . ." McDonald v. Mabee (1917) 243 U. S. 9o, 91, 37 Sup. Ct.
343. See in general Scott, Funidanentals of Procedure in Actions at Law (1922)
cI. I.
What Mr. Justice Holmes probably had in mind when he made these state-
ments was a territorial theory of the law. If state A through its officers seized
an individual, X, in state B, that would clearly be a violation of an international
duty toward state B. Since state A does not have the privilege nor perhaps the
power to effect such a seizure, one might say that state A did not have "potential
physical control" of X. This seems to have had some influence in the shaping
of the territorial notion that the courts of state A will not ordinarily exercise
jurisdiction in a civil case in which X is the defendant nor order "service of
process" on X in state B in a suit by a resident of state A. Such a limitation-
apparently self-imposed-is not necessarily justified on policy nor does it seem
sound on analysis. If such a proceeding-suit and notice to X in state B-were
allowed, and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, a change in the legal relations of
X at least in state A would be effected. See supra note 5 and text. The mere
transmission of knowledge to X in state B is not a breach of duty by state A
toward state B. A classic instance of this is found in the exercise of the ins avo-
candi in state B by a consular representative of state A. See Borchard, The
Diplonatic Protection of Citizens Abroad (1915) sec. 346. But this notion of
territoriality or "potential physical control" of the person has had at least an
unconscious influence in the course of judicial decision and has been strictly
adhered to in many instances.
* "But when that power exists and is asserted by service at the beginning of a
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still persists and is the framework of the bulk of rules governing ser-
vice of process; the language of the courts is still to the effect that actual
knowledge of a pending action and ample opportunity to defend will
not necessarily dispense with the requirement." But a tendency may
nevertheless be observed to make knowledge of a pending suit and full
opportunity to defend in conjunction with other facts the raisons d'&re
of service of process. Exceptions are carved out of the older notion
in subservience to ihe modern tendency. The older notion and the
present tendency are not always well recognized; inconsistent argumen-
tation seems inevitable, and the one or the other is adopted by the .court
to effectuate justice in the particular litigation. The problem is brought
to a head when nonresidents are concerned. If potential physical con-
trol is necessary to justify the court in exercising jurisdiction, then it'
is almost hopeless to attempt to proceed against a nonresident. But if
the sole object of service of process is assumed to be notice, and service
is not possible, then actual notice brought home to the defendant in any
other way, provided other necessary facts are present, should suffice.
The interplay of these two elements is evident in the mass of decisions
on the subject in all its phases.9
Since at common law a court will not ordinarily exercise jurisdiction
over the person of anyone beyond its territorial limits, statutes providing
for substituted service at the last known place of abode of the defendant
within the state or constructive service by publication so as to justify or
compel the exercise of such jurisdiction at once suggest themselves.
In the United States, the problem of such service is inextricably con-
nected with questions of constitutional law, namely, whether there has
been a compliance with the due process clause,10 or with the privileges
and immunities clauses of the Federal Constitution.1 It seems as an
original question that the only constitutional complaint the defendant
might have would be with reference to a want of reasonable notice of
the suit and an adequate opportunity to defend and that the pertinent
cause, or if the party submits to the jurisdiction in whatever form may be required,
we dispense with the necessity of maintaining the physical power and attribute the
same force to the judgment or decree whether the party remain within the juris-
diction or not." Holmes, J., in Mich. Trust Co. v. Ferry, supra note 6, at p. 353,
33 Sup. Ct. at p. 552. ".. . . in civilized times it is not necessary to maintain that
power throughout proceedings properly begun, and . . .submission to the juris-
diction by appearance may take the place of service upon the person." Holmes,
J., in McDonald v. Mabee, supra note 6, at p. 91, 37 Sup. Ct. at p. 343. See
supra note 6.
8Cf. infra note 38.
SSee further In re Busfield (x886, C. A.) L. R. 32 Ch. Div. 123; Beale, The
Jurisdiction of Courts over Foreigners (1913) 26 HARv. L. REv. 193, 283, 284;
Scott, Jurisdiction over Nonresidents Doing Business within a State (1919) 32
ibid. 871. Under the French law, jurisdiction is exercised at the domicile of the
plaintiff in personal, actions and actions as to movables. See Pillet, Jurisdiction
in Actions between Foreigners (i9o5) i8 H-av. L. REV. 325, 334 et seq.
0 U. S. Const. Amend. XIV, sec. i.
'U. S. Const. Art. IV, sec. 2; ibid. Amend. XIV, sec. i.
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clauses of the Constitution were not intended to enlarge in scope the old
notion of potential physical control of the person.12 But such has notbeen the course of constitutional interpretation, though frank recogni-
tion of the present tendency is evident in the emphasis which is givento it in the making of exceptions. In Pennoyer v. Neff'2 it was stated
that a judgment in personam rendered against a nonresident upon con-
structive service of process would be a denial of due process. Although
mere dictunm, 4 this statement became the foundation of the law laterdeveloped. The court in that case, in considering the difference between
actions in rem and actions in personam,5 intimated that vicarious ser-
vice would be more likely to result in actual notice to the defendant inthe former classes of actions than in the latter."8 This hardly seems
tenable 7 and is doubtful as a reason in the retrospect of history;' s
" What other facts are necessary to give or justify the exercise of jurisdictionis beyond the scope of the present discussion. Wherever it is stated herein that
notice of the suit and an adequate opportunity to defend should suffice, it is
assumed that such other operative facts exist
" (1877) 95 U. S. 714. See also Grubel v. Natssauer (II3) 21o N. Y. 149, 1O3
N. E. 1113.
" The case arose before the Fourteenth Amendment became operative.
"Proceedings and judgments in rein, quasi in rem., and in personam have beenthe subjects of many discussions. See Scott, loc. cit. supra- note 6; Hohfeld,Fundaeneital Legal Conceptions (1923) 102 et seq.; Cook, op. cit. supra note 2,at pp. 37, io6, passim. In actions in remn, the court is not troubled over personal
service on a nonresident, for the state's potential physical control of the res-land, chattel-is the operative fact. But here also due process is denied if reason-
able notice of the suit is lacking. Roller v. Holly (igoo) 176 U. S. 398, 20 Sup.Ct. 410. So far as notice in any sort of action is concerned, even the commonlaw seems to have required that "natural justice" be done. See McDonald v.Mabee, supra note 6, at p. 91, 37 Sup. Ct. at p. 343. See also Feyerick v. Hubbard(9o2) 71 L. K. B. 509, 512; but cf. Douglas v. Forrest (1828, C. P.) 4 Bing. 686.For the meaning of "natural justice," see Corbin, Rights and Duties (1924) 33YALE LAW JoURNAL, 501, 503, 504. See in general COMMENTS (1922) 3I'YALm
LAW JOURNAL, 425; 24 L. R. A. (m. s.) I79, note.The enlargement of the category of actions in rein seems to be one of the judi-cial processes devised to justify the courts in applying more flexible rules.Thus, a "status" is conceived of as a res and an action involving a "status" isuniversally denominated in rein. "The jurisdiction which every State possessesto determine the civil status and capacities of all its inhabitants involves authorityto prescribe the conditions on which proceedings affecting them may be com-
menced and carried on with its territory." Pennoyer v. Neff, supra note 13, atP. 734 (dictum). Cf. 2 Bishop; Marriage, Divorce, and Separation- (18g) sees.I4o-142, 554. Since society has such a concern in the relation between husband
and wife, it is not hard to imagine a case where a nonresident recalcitrant spousecould otherwise check necessary societal action. Cf. Beale, Progress of the Law,
A958-5959--The Conflict of Laws (1919) 33 HARv. L. REv. I, 12, 13.
"6 "The law assumes that property is always in the possession of its owner, inperson or by agent; and it proceeds upon the theory that its seizure will informhim, not only that it is taken into the custody of the court, but that he must look to
any proceedings authorized by law upon such seizure for its condemnation and
sale." Pennoyer v. Neff, supra note 13, at p. 727.Tjustice Hunt, dissenting, answered the majority thus: "Such seizure is not initself notice to the defendant, and it is not certain that he will by that means
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and yet the implication that to-day notice is the rational basis of the
institution is not to be ignored. The court inadvertently betrayed the
inadaptability of the old notion under present conditions.
But there are many different situations where different rules have
been deemed applicable. Thus, a nonresident can remove the disability
of the cou rt or justify the court in exercising jurisdiction where it
exists by his factual consent by accepting service of process, 9 or by
defending .on the merits,2 0 or even by assenting in advance to waive
the requirement of service, as by confession of judgment by an attor-
ney.21  If the absent defendant is a resident of the state in which action
has been brought, notice by publication will suffice to justify the court
in exercising jurisdiction.2 2  Once the court has acquired or exercised
jurisdiction over a nonresident, the latter is liable to any sort of process
receive notice. Adopted as a means of communicating it, and although a very
good means, it is not the only one, nor necessarily better than a publication of the
pendency of the suit, made with an honest intention to reach the debtor."
Pennoyer v. Neff, supra note 13, at p. 747. And see COMMENTS (1917) 26 YAL,E
LAW JOURNAL, 492.
"See supra note 6; cf. supra note 15.
"Beale, op. cit. supra note 9, at p. 297. The English courts will give effect to a
judgment of a foreigntribunal where the defendant has assented in advance to the
sort of proceedings used and to the exercise of jurisdiction by the foreign tribunal
in accordance with the law of the foreign country. Copin v. Adamson (1874)
L. R. 9 Exch. 345; Rousillon v. Romsillon (i88o) L. R. I4 Ch. Div. 351; Feyerick
v. Hubbard, supra note I5. Under the English Rules of Court, jurisdiction will
now be exercised over nonresidents in certain classes of actions in personam. See
generally Dicey, Conflict of Laws (3d ed. 1922) 250 et seq.
'Harris v. Taylor [1915, C. A.] 2 K. B. 58o; cf. Harrison v. Farrington
(1882, CIL) 35 N. J. Eq. 4; Chic. Life Ins. Co. v. Ciherry, supra note 2. But if
appearance is for the express and sole purpose of contesting "jurisdiction," the
defendant is not deemed to have waived his privilege or his immunity. Beale,
op. cit. supra note 9, at p. 298. See also CoMmTS (1919) 28 YALE LAw
JOURNAL, 579.
'Hazel v. Jacobs (1910) 78 N. J3. L. 459, 75 Atl. 9o3 (not clear whether waiver
of privilege merely or of immunity also, since no discussion of due process
clause); and see (1924) 73 U. PA. L. REv. 98; 38 L. R. A. (N. s.) 814, note. A
written acceptance of service upon a nonresident by the latter's attorney will riot
justify the exercise of jurisdiction where the latter lacks authority to accept.
Dolber v. Young (1923, N. H.) 123 AtI. 218 (no mention of constitutional ques-
tion, though talk of "jurisdiction"); see (1924) io VA. L. Rlv. 559; and cf. NoTEs
(1923) 23 COL. L. REV. 765.
"He derson v. Staniford (187o) 105 Mass. 504; contra: De la Montanya v.
De la Montan~ta (1896) 112 Calif. IOI, 44 Pac. 345 (though Peniwyer v. Neff,
supra note 13, was referred to with approval, no emphasis was placed on the
question" of the constitutionality of the California statute under the due process
clause) ; see Raker v. Raher (1911) 156 Iowa, 511, 129 N. W. 494 (Iowa statute
unconstitutional under due process clause, hence lack of jurisdiction). And see
35 L. R. A. (N. s.) 292. There is hardly any justification for the minority rule
when the defendant deliberately leaves the state to evade service of process. But
if the defendant's absence is accompanied by an intent not to return, it seems that
such service is operative; but query whether substituted service at the defendant's
last and usual place of abode would suffice. McDonald v. Mabee, supra note 6,
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arising out of the litigation.2 3 And so a nonresident temporarily within
the state is liable to actual service of process24 except when he has been
inveigled there by the fraud of the plaintiff. 25
at pp. 92, 93, 37 Sup. Ct. at p. 344; see L. R. A. 1917 C, 1143, note. See further
NoTES (1911) 11 COL. L. REv. 352; cf. COmmENTS (1917) 26 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 492.
' Beale, op. cit. supra note 9, at p. 299; see Chic. Life Ins. Co. v. Cherry, supra
note 2, at pp. 29, 30, 37 Sup. Ct. at p. 493. Such proceedings "are considered as
rather a continuation of the original litigation than the commencement of a new
action." Pennoyer v. Neff, supra note 13, at p. 734 (dictum) ; cf. (1924) 1o VA.L. REv. 559, 56o. In Mich. Trust Co. v. Ferry, supra note 6, at p. 353, 33 Sup.
Ct. at p. 552, Mr. Justice Holmes said: "It is within the power of a State to
make the whole administration of the estate a single proceeding, to provide that
one who has undertaken it within the jurisdiction shall be subject to the order of
the court in the matter until the administration is closed by distribution. . .
See also supra note 7.
'-Fisher, Brown & Co. v. Fielding (1895) 67 Conn. 91, 34 At. 714. But not
if he is going to or coming from court as a witness, the policy being to encourage
the appearance of witnesses. Prescott v. Prescott (1923, N. J. Ch.) 122 Atl.
611; see (1924) 22 MICH. L. REv. 849. Nor will jurisdiction be exercised over
a domestic or foreign corporation where such a witness is one of its officers and
a nonresident, whose presence is not demanded by any other business of the
corporation. Hammons v. Super. Ct. (1923) 63 Calif. App. 7oo, 219 Pac. 1037;
see (1923) 12 CALIF. L. Rxv. 63; (1924) 37 I-iARv. L. Rxv. 631. See also (1922)22 CoL. L. REv. 598. Nor can the defendant be served in such manner to appearbefore a federal court while returning as a witness from a state court in the
same district. Page Co. v. Macdonald (1923) 261 U. S. 446, 43 Sup. Ct. 416;
see (1923) 23 CoL. L. Rxv. 687. But a nonresident is not immune from service
of process where his presence in the state is due to a desire to listen to the
argument of an appeal in a case in which he is a litigant. Sampson v. Graves
(1924, Sup. Ct Spec. T.) 122 Misc. 314, 204 N. Y. Supp. 212, affirmed without
opinion (1924, App. Div. Ist Dept.) 204 N. Y. Supp. 945; see (1924) 24 COL.L. REv. 68d. See further Lorenzen, Cases on the Conflict of Laws (2d ed. 1924)
129, note.
Cavanagh v. Manhattan Transit Co. (195o, C. C. D. N. J.) 133 Fed. 818(secretary of foreign corporation served at close of business interview withplaintiff's agent, to which he had been invited) ; see Union Sugar Refinery Co.
v. Mathiesson (1864, D. Mass.) 2 Cliff. 304, 307 (service at close of interview,insufficient evidence of deception); Taylor, Petitioner (19o8) 29 R. I. 129, 131,
69 AtI. 553, 554 (finding that no fraud). And so where deceit is practiced toinduce the defendant to send his assets into the state where they can be attached.
Van Donselaar v. Jones (1923) 195 Iowa, 1O81, 192 N. W. 22. But where 'adefendant comes into the state for the purpose of being present at the taking of
a deposition, taken according to notice, if service would otherwise be good, it is
not made bad by the fact that notice was given for the sole purpose of inducing
the defendant to enter the state. faster v. Currie (19o5) 198 U. S. 144, 25 Sup.Ct. 614. See also Siro v. American Express Co. (1923) 99 Conn. 95, 121 Atl.28o; see (1923) 23 COL. L. REv. 689; (1923) 22 MICH. L. REV. 170.
In this connection, Professor Beale observes that "though it is ordinarily said
that in this case the courts of the state into which a party is inveigled by fraudhave no jurisdiction over him, the truth is that there is no defect of jurisdiction,
but the fraud of the judgment plaintiff is the basis of an equitable plea in bar of
the judgment; and this is proved by the fact that if the fraud is that of a thirdparty, and does not personally charge the judgment plaintiff, the judgment is
perfectly good in spite of the fact that the judgment defendant was fraudulently
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The industrial evolution of the nineteenth century with large-scale
production paved the way for an increase in corporate enterprises. As
corporations extended their activities into other states, legal relations
were created with the inhabitants of those states. A rigid adherence to
the general notions regarding service of process would have obviously
meant little if any successful litigation against foreign corporations.
An unconscious adaptation to the changing situation took place, accord-
ing as exigencies demanded.2 6  There is a wealth of theoretical discus-
sion as to when and how service is to be effected on a foreign corpora-
tion. Doubtless if a foreign corporation could be within the state of
the forum in the same sense as a nonresident individual,27 there might
be little dispute as to its liability to service of process. The English
courts have found no difficulty in attributing to a corporation plurality
of "domicile" for the purpose of exercising jurisdiction28 and in having
service made on a proper agent in charge of the local business; but there
is some doubt as to whether this view or a previous-consent theory is at
the basis of the American decisions. 29 The American courts almost as
inveigled into the state. It would seem, then, that in the case of 'fraud there is
no real exception to the general principle that a foreigner personally found
within-the territory of a sovereign is subject to the jurisdiction of his courts."
Op. cit. supra note 9, at pp. 285, 286. The cases make little if any attempt to
distinguish between lack of jurisdiction and mere refusal .to exercise such juris-
diction, even though it exists, to avoid perpetrating an injustice in the particular
case. It seems that if the case arose or arises under the Fourteenth Amendment,
there is a jurisdictional defect. To be sure, such lack of power has to be brought
to the fiotice of the court, e.g., by "an equitable plea in bar of the judgment"; and
failure to do so will result in the court's exercising "jurisdiction" over him and,
ceteris paribus, rendering judgment for the plaintiff. But in the definition of
any legal relation it is assumed as a mere matter of convenience that the proper
procedural machinery will be successfully set in motion; definitions of legal
relations are necessarily predicated upon such an assumption. Cf. Gray, The
Nature and Sources of the Law (2d ed. 1921) io6; Willoughby, The Funda-
nental Concepts of Public Law (1924) 144, 145, and note.
' See in general Cahill, Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations and Individuals
Who Carry on Business Within the Territory (1917) 3o HARv. L. REv. 676.
' See supra note 24 and text.
'Dunlop Pneunmatic Tyre Co. v. Actiengesellschaft etc. Co. [19o2, C. A.] i
K. B. 342: "It [a foreign corporation] can only so reside [in England] through
its agent, not being a concrete entity itself; but, if it so resides by its agent, it
must be considered for this purpose as itself residing within the jurisdiction."
Collins, M. R., -at p: 347. "A corporation can, of course, only be said to reside
anywhere in a figurative sense, and it has been held for the present purpose to
reside in a place where it carries on its business." Mathew, L. J., at p. 349.
. See Cahill, op. cit. supra note 26, at p. 686 et seq., where statutes also are
discussed. St. Clair v. Cox (1882) io6 U. S. 350, 1 Sup. Ct. 354, seems to have
proceeded on both these theories. See also B. & Q. R. R. v. Harris (1870, U.
S.) 12 Wall. 65. That the notion of a previous consent is a mere fiction was
recognized in Pa. Fire Ins. Co. of Phila. v. Gold Issue & M. Co. (1917) :43
,U. S. 93, 96, 37 Sup. Ct. 344, 345, where Mr. Justice Holmes said, ". . . this
consent is a mere fiction, justified by holding the corporation estopped to set up
its own wrong as a defence. Presumably the fiction was adopted to reconcile
the intimation with the general rules concerning jurisdiction." The learned
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a unit seized upon the fact that the corporation is a creature of the state;
that its privileges and powers are in general enumerated; and that since
a state has the privilege to exclude from its borders any foreign corpora-
tion,3 it follows that it can impose conditions upon their admission,
such as liability to the jurisdiction of the courts. But this privilege
wholly to exclude does not always obtain, especially where the corpora-
tion is engaged solely in interstate commerce, though even in the latter
case some conditions can be imposed in certain instances.81 Judge
Learned Hand has pierced through this formula of consent and sug-
gested a matter-of-fact theory, namely, public necessity and conven-
ience. 2  Parallel with this development has been a growth of law on
what constitutes "doing business" in the state by a corporation.33 Diffi-
Justice in fact conceded the soundness of the view as to consent advanced by
Judge Learned Hand. See infra note 32. See in general COmmExTs (1924)
33 YALE LAW JOuRNAL, 547.
'Paul v. Virginia (1869, U. S.) 8 Wall. I68. The reason is that a corporation
,is not a citizen and hence does not enjoy the protection of the privileges and
immunities clauses. As an original question, the conclusion might seem to be
doubtful. See Cahill, op. cit. supra note 26, at p. 7oi, note 8r. Cf. also infra
note 38.
" Thi% point is fully treated in Scott, op. cit. supra note 9, at p. 878. Such
conditions are not to result in unreasonable burdens on interstate commerce.
Davis v. Farmers Co-operative Equity Co. (1923) 262 U. S. 312, 43 Sup. Ct.
556; see COMMENTS (1924) 33 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 547.
'In Snwlik v. Phila. R. C. & I. Co. (1915, S.D.N.Y.) 2= Fed. 148, 151, he
said: "One [referring to arguments of counsel] must be vicious, and the vice arises
I think from confounding a legal fiction with a statement of fact. When it is
said that a foreign corporation will be taken to have consented to the appoint-
ment of an agent to accept service, the court does not mean that as a fact it
has consented at all, because the corporation does not in fact consent; but the
court, for purposes of justice, treats it as if it had. It is true that the con-
sequences so imputed to it lie within its own control, since it need not do business
within the state, but that is not equivalent to a consent; actually it might have
refused to appoint, and yet its refusal would make no difference. The court,
in the interests of justice, imputes results to the voluntary act of. doing business
within the foreign state, quite independently of any intent." And he concluded:
"The limits of that consent are as independent of any actual intent as the con-
sent itself. Being a mere creature of justice it will have such consent only asjustice requires; hence it may be limited. . . . The actual consent in the cases
at bar has no such latitudinarian possibilities; it must be measured by the proper
meaning to be attributed to the words used, and, when that meaning calls for
wide application, such must be given." How far the courts will be willing to
take this realistic attitude is problematic. Beale, op. cit. supra note 15, at p. II.
'The English courts have had to wrestle with the same problem. Cf. supra
note 28. In the following cases, the foreign corporation was deemed to be "doing
business" in England: Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. Actiengesellschaft etc. Co.,
supra note 28 (conduct of "stand" for exhibition of articles of manufacture at
cycle show which lasted nine days, in charge of agent who took orders and
pressed sales generally); Saccharin Corp. v. Chemische Fabrik von Heyden
Actiengesellschaft [1911, C. A.] 2 K. B. 516 (fact that representative was agent
for another firm, form of his remuneration, fact that place of business occupied
without payment of rent immaterial; representative had power to make
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culties have cropped up in borderline cases; similar factual situations
have given rise to crystallized rules of law.34 The result in most cases
seems to have followed from some "inarticulate major premise" in the
mind of the court as to what is just or unjust.
There are enormous possibilities in the broad view elucidated by
judge Learned Hand.35  Assuming that it is sound, it might be urged
that it should be applicable to cases of foreign partnerships and non-
resident individuals.36 But the courts have adopted a rule contrary to
those which prevail in the case of foreign corporations, traceable to the
commonplace notion that members of a partnership and individuals are
within the protection of the privileges and immunities clauses of the
Constitution3 7 and hence may not be excluded from doing business in
other states.38 Even in an action for personal injuries caused within
contracts); Actiesselskabet Dampskib "Hercules" v. Grand Trunk Pac. Ry.
[19i2, C. A.] I K. B. 222 (funds invested and capital and bonds issued by London
committee; fact that no rent paid for premises immaterial).
"
4 Among the American cases involving this specific problem, see St. Clair v.
Cox, supra note 29; Mitt. Reserve Life Assoc. v. Phelps (1903) 19o U. S. 147, 23.
Sup. Ct. 707; Snzolik v. Phila. & R. C. & I. Co., supra note 32; Pa. Fire Ins. Co.
of Phila. v. Gold Isse M. & M. Co., supra note 29; see also Chipman v. Jeffrey
Co. (1920) :5 U. S. 373, 40 Sup. Ct. 172; Davis v. Farmers Co-Operative Equity
Co., supra note 31. See in general Osborne, "Arising out of Business Doe in the
State" (1923) 7 MINN. L. REv. 380; NOTES AND COMMENT (1923) 8 CORN. L.
QUART. 263; COMMENTS (924) 33 YALE LAW JOURNA.L, 547; (1922) 22 COL. L.
RFv. 83; (1922) 22 ibid. 598; (1921) 35 HARv. L. R~v. 87; (924) 37 ibid. 631;
(1923) 22 MIcH. L. REv. 77; (1921) 31 YAi LAW JOURNAL, 205; (1922) 31
ibid. 336. Cf. L. R. A. 1916 F, 410, note.
See supra note 32.
=C f. Beale, op. cit. supra note 15, at pp. 1', 12. In Penitoyer v. Neff, supra
note 13, at p. 735, there is a strong dictum to the effect that a nonresident entering
into a partnership or association within the state or making contracts enforceable
there could be required to appoint an agent to receive service of process in pro-
ceedings instituted with respect to such partnership, association or contracts, or to
designate a place where such service could be made and notice given; and it
could be provided that on failure to make such appointment or designate such
place, service could be made on a public officer designated for that purpose or in
some other prescribed way. But the trend of judicial decision has been otherwise.
See infra note 43.
See supra notes 10, 11.
The cases which purport to be based on this proposition are not quite satis-
factory upon a close examination of the particular situation. In Brooks v. Dun
(1892, C. C. W. D. Tenn.) 51 Fed. 138, the conclusion is a mere dictum since the
court first found as a matter of construction that the state statute governing
service of process did not apply. In Caldwell v. Armour & Co. (1899, Del.
Super. Ct) I Pen. 545, 43 At. 517, the court was troubled by the fact that the
statute applied equally to causes of action arising out of the state as within. It
was afraid to indulge in judicial legislation by holding the statute severable; yet
that has been done quite frequently in the case of foreign corporations. See Scott,
op. cit. su pra note 9, at p. 89o. The court concluded that probability of actual
notice, or actual notice, of pendency of the action was therefore immaterial. It
seems it was carrying over into the constitutional problem the old notion of poten-
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the state the rule as to partnerships has operated unyieldingly and in
that way manifested its worst aspects.39 The courts have not clearly
enumerated these "privileges and immunities." 40  Maybe service on an
agent of a partnership is operative where the defendant partnership
"resides" in a distant state and may never have been within the state of
the forum.41  The number of citizens of a particular state "residing"
beyond its limits and upon whom service by leaving a copy with an
agent would be sufficient is comparatively so small as not to justify such
sort of service on nonresidents who are not citizens.42 A leaning in
favor of the orthodox rule is evident in a late decision of the United
States Supreme Court.43  The stern insistence upon the difference in
character between a foreign corporation and a foreign partnership as
regards the state's privilege to exclude is at the root of the difference
in rules ;44 but one cannot, it seems, escape the fact that there is a differ-
ence in situation between resident partners and individuals and non-
resident partners and individuals that should justify a difference in
treatment with respect to service of process unless one is to cling tena-
ciously to the old notion of potential physical control of the person.4
Whether much resentment will-be aroused against the rule will depend
upon the number of instances in which it will be called into play.
In this state of the law, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
in Pawloski v. Hess (1924) 144 N. E. 76o,4" was called upon to face
the problem in another aspect. In that case, the sole question before
tial physical control of the person. See supra note 6. In Cabanne v. Graf (19o2)
87 Minn. 51o, 92 N. W. 461, though the statute was appiicable to nonresident indi-
viduals, associations and corporations, the sole question before the court was its
constitutionality with respect to an individual. The question was expressly left
open with respect to associations and copartnerships, "quasi legal entities," to the
extent of binding their assets within the state.
'Aikmann v. Sanderson & Porter (19o8) 122 La. 266, 47 So. 6oo.
'But cf. Slaughter-House Cases (1873, U. S.) 16 Wall. 36. See in general
McGovney, Privileges or Immunities Clause-Fourteenth Amendment (1918) 4
IowA L. BuL. 219.
'This situation is given hypothetically in Caldwell v. Armour & Co., supra note
38, at p. 548, 43 Atl. at p. 518.
"See Mordock v. Kirby (I9O2, C. C. W. D. Ky.) 118 Fed. i8o, 182.
"Flexiwr v. Farson (1919) 248 U. S. 289, 293, 39 Sup. Ct. 97, 98, where Mr.
Justice Holmes said: "But the consent that is said to be implied in such cases is a
mere fiction, founded upon the accepted doctrine that the States could exclude
foreign corporations altogether, and therefore could establish this obligation as a
condition to letting them in." For a criticism of the reasoning in that case and
expressions of belief that the decision is sound on its facts, but that many of the
statements made are merely dicta and that the question may be regarded as still
open in the Supreme Court, see Scott, op. cit. su ra note 9, at p. 877 et seq.; and
see Beale, op. cit. supra note I5, at pp. II, 12; Burdick, Service as a Requirement
of Due Process in Actions in Personamn (1922) 2o Micu. L. REv. 422, 423 et seq.
See also (1919) 3 MINN. L. REv. 277; (1919) 28 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 512.
See supra note 43.
See supra note 6.
'See (1924) 38 HARV. L. REv. III.
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the court was the constitutionality of a state statute providing for service
of process upon the Registrar of Motor Vehicles in an action against a
nonresident operator of a motor vehicle arising out of an accident
involving the defendant while operating such motor vehicle on the high-
ways of Massachusetts.4 7  Although that statute contains recitals of the
consent-theory, one cannot overlook the ample safeguards provided for
giving the defendants notice of the suit. The emphasis placed upon
notice is in accordance with the trend previously referred to 48 and away
from the potential physical-control notion. If the defendant could have
been found within Massachusetts at the time of action brought, there is
some doubt whether service in accordance with the statute would have
been constitutional in view of the possibility of effecting personal ser-
vice.49  The Massachusetts court had little precedent on which to rely.50
In the opening portions of its opinion, it stressed the many problems
created by reason of the presence of motor vehicles on the highways
and asserted in effect that the police power to be exercised in view of
the situation was paramount over other considerations.51 Whether one
" "The acceptance by a non-resident of the rights and privileges conferred by
section three or four, as evidenced by his operating a motor vehicle thereunder,
or the operation by a non-resident of a motor vehicle on a public i4ay in the
commonwealth other than under said sections, shall be deemed equivalent to an
appointment by such nonresident of the registrar or his successor in office, to be
his true and lawful attorney upon whom may be served all lawful processes in
any action or proceeding against him, growing, out of any accident or collision in
which said non-resident may be involved while operating a motor vehicle in such
a way, .and said acceptance or operation shall be a signification of his agreement
that any such process against him which is so served shall be of the same legal
force and validity as if served on him personally. Service .... shall be made by
leaving a copy .... in the hands of the registrar, or in his office .... Provided,
that notice .... and a copy .... are forthwith sent by registered mail by the
plaintiff to the defendant, and the defendant's return receipt and the plaintiff's
affidavit of compliance herewith are appended to the writ and entered with the
declaration. The court .... may order such continuances as may be necessary to
afford the defendant reasonable opportunity to defend the action." Mass. Acts,
1923, . 431, sec. 2.
', See also supra note 12.
' As was done in Fisher, Brozt "& Co. v. Fielding, supra note 24.
In the one case in point and on which the Massachusetts court relied, Kane v.
New Jersey (1916) 242 U. S. 16o, 37 Sup. Ct. 3o, the statute provided that the
nonresident owner file with the Secretary of State an instrument "constituting"
the latter and successors in office his attorney upon whom process could be served
"in any action or legal proceeding caused by the operation of his registered motor
vehicle, within this State, against such owner." Mr. Justice Brandeis placed his
decision squarely on the ground that the presence of the automobile on the highway
has given rise to many evils and that the statute in question was reasonably
adapted to cope with some phases of that evil. See Scott, op. cit. supra note 9, at
p. 886 et seq.; Burdick, op. cit. supra note 43, at p. 425; COMMENT (1917) 5
CALi'. L. REv. 252; (1917) 26 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 422.
' See supra note 50. Cf. The Automobile-Its Province and Problems (1924)
116 THE ANNALS, 169-198.
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calls this a delimitation of the old view or the formulation of a new
one for a class of cases sui generis, the decision is unquestionably sound.
The case well supports the proposition that the law follows the mores. 52
INDEMNITY AND CONTRIBUTION BETWEEN JOINT TORT FEASORS
The longevity of principles of law is not always measured by their
utility as judged by reference to decisions under them. The spell cast
by the euphonious phrasing of a rule long after the exceptions to that
rule have cut away its usefulness is exemplified by the decision in the
case of Horrabin v. City of Des Moines (1924, Iowa) i99 N. W. 988.
A contractor was engaged by a municipality to construct a bridge, the
city engineer designating the termini of the bridge. In locating the
bridgeheads at these points the contractor trespassed on another's land,
and the injured party recovered a joint judgment against the city and
the contractor.1 The contractor having paid the judgment, here sought
indemnity against the city. Though the law governing the point of the
case has been well settled for at least a century,2 the court. in allowing
the indemnity felt obliged to invoke the principle "there can be no indem-
nity or contribution between joint tort feasors," and then to enumerate
the many "exceptions" to the rule in order to find a pigeon hole for the
instant case.
In the leading case of Merryweather v. Nixan,8 Lord Kenyon said
that ". . . no contribution could by law be claimed as between joint
wrongdoers."4  An inclination to use the concepts of indemnity and
contribution interchangeably,5 probably aided by Lord Kenyon's infer-
ence that the courts should never aid a "wrongdoer," resulted in the
' It has been suggested that Congress has the power to provide for service in
other states of state process in civil actions. See Cook, The Powers of Congress
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause (igig) 28 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 421, 428
et seq. This seems to be an effective method for remedying the unfortunate situa-
tions discussed herein.
The problem of indemnity and contribution between joint tort feasors would
be considerably simplified could the damages be apportioned in the judgment for
the injury as is sometimes done by the courts of Admiralty. However, at com-
mon law, since the whole question is the right of recovery of the injured party,
the law gives the plaintiff his recovery against all or any of the tort feasors.
(923) 33 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 213.
2 Adamson v. Jarvis (827, C. P.) 4 Bing. 66.
' (1799, K. B.) 8 T. R. 186"
'In considering the present day application of this century old rule, it is well
to bear in mind that the concept of "wrongdoer" in Lord Kenyon's day is not
at all synonymous with our own concept of "tort feasor," our concept being a
much wider and more inclusive one. Reath, Contribution between Persons
Jointly Charged for Negligence (899) 12 HARv. L. REv. 176.
'It seems advisable to make the same distinction between "indemnity" and
"contribution" here, as is made in other branches of the law. To indemnify, is
to save harmless. To contribute, is to share the burden.
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courts interpreting the rule thus announced as "there is no contribution
or indemnity between joint tort feasors."'  The decisions whether deal-
ing with indemnity or contribution cite the original pronouncement as
ruling the cases. In the intervening years the courts by the device of
"exceptions" have demolished the rule,7 yet it remains in the law to be
argued down by each new decision. This condition invites an attempt
to analyze the decisions,8 for the purpose of ascertaining exactly to what
extent this rule really helps us to decide cases. We shall first consider
the rule as applied to indemnity.
A dictum set out in the leading case9 almost immediately became the
basis of the first exception to the general rule. The servant or agent
who acts at the command of his master or principal, the act being one
that he cannot be expected to have known was wrongful, may have
indemnity. 10 For a similar reason the master or principal, held liable
for the tort of his servant or agent, unless such tort was specifically
ordered by him, may have indemnity against such servant or agent.11
A second exception covers an analogous class of cases where because
of statute, franchise, charter, or contract, one party is primarily respon-
sible, but is ,subjected to that responsibility through the negligence of
another whose act was the real cause of the injury. This exception
covers a wide variety of cases; a municipality may have indemnity from
an individual whose act in misusing a sidewalk caused injury for which
the city was held liable ;12 a gas company charged with the duty of not
allowing gas to escape may recover from a street railway company
'Horrdbin v. City of Des Moines (1924, Iowa) 199 N. W. 988, 990; see also
Adamson v. Jarvis, supra note 2.
" "The maxim is now subject to so many limitations that, stated without qualifi-
cations, it can hardly be recognized as a rule of law." Woodward, Quasi Con-
tracts (1913) 402. "Indeed, we think this maxim too much broken in upon at
this .day to be called with propriety a rule of law." Bailey v. Bussing (1859)
8 Conn. 455, 459; and to the same effect, i Cooley, Torts (3d ed. 19o6) sec.
167; Keener, Quasi Contracts (2d ed. I893) 408, et seq.; 4o L. R. A. (N. s.) 1147.
' Classifications and "exceptions" are almost as numerous as the decisins and
writings on the point. An attempt has been made herein to group many of these
"exceptions" where it seems possible to apply the same rule to several.
'Merryweather v. Nixam, supra note 3, at p. i86, ". . this decision would not
affect cases of indemnity where one man employed another to do acts, not
unlawful in themselves, for the purpose of asserting a right."
' Adamson v. Jarvis, supra note 2; Hoggan v. Cahoon (1903) 26 Utah, 444,
73 Pac. 512; i Mechem, Agency (2d ed. 1914) sec. 16o3.
"Grand Trunk v. Latham (1874) 63 Me. 177; Smith v. Foran (1875) 43 Conn.
244; Ga. South and Fla. Ry. v. Jossey (i898) 105 Ga. 271, 34 S. E. 664;
N. Y. Consol. Ry. v. Mass. Bonding- and Ins. Co. (1920, 2d Dept.)193 App.
Div. 438, 184 N. Y. Supp. 243, with excellent note of the case in NOTEs and
CommENT (1922) 6 CORN. L. QUART. 339; see Bradley v. Rosenthal (908) 154
Calif. 42o, 423, 97 Pac. 875, 876; Betcher v. McChesney (917) 255 Pa. 394, 398,
OO At. 124, 125; 2 Cooley, op. cit. supra note 6, at p. 1172.
Washington Gas Light Co. v. Dist. of Columbia (895) I61 U. S. 316, 16
Sup. Ct 564.
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whose negligence caused the leak in the pipe.' 3 The owner of a house
may recover from a company that illegally attached wires to his chimney
causing it to fall and injure another.14 In such cases, indemnity is
universally allowed.15
The third group comprises those cases where the negligence of the
plaintiff is the basis of the tort liability for which he has been held. 6
Cases involving successive negligent acts, and refusing indemnity are
cited as authority for the "no contribution" rule. Cases allowing indem-
nity are treated as "exceptions." That the rule of Merryweather v.
Nixan is superfluous in all of these cases may appear from a considera-
tion of a simple hypothetical problem. A, while negligently conducting
himself, is injured by B who is negligently driving his automobile.
Despite A's contributory negligence, A may recover full damages from
B if A can prove that B had the last clear chance to avoid.' 7 Oppo-
sitely, under such a state of facts, B cannot recover from A for damage
to his automobile. The principle "there can be no contribution or
indemnity between joint tort feasors" has never been 'applied to such a
state of facts. In the same case, suppose that in addition to A's suffer-
ing bodily injury, he is hurled against C who is not negligent, and who
is injured thereby. C having sued both A and B has recovered a judg-
ment which A has paid. In a suit by A against B there would seem to
be no more reason for invoking the "no contribution" rule against A's
recovery for the damages paid to C, than against recovery for injury to
A himself. Oppositely, if B has paid the judgment, since he cannot
recover for the damage to his automobile, there is no valid reason why
A should pay for the injury to C, and hence no valid r~ason why the "no
contribution" rule should be cited as governing the decision, when, at
most, it merely describes the result in the particular case. The excel-
lent decision which first suggested this reasoning has unfortunately been
13Philadelphia Co. v,. Central Traction Co. (895) 165 Pa. 456, 30 At. 934.
' Gray v. Boston Gas Light Co. (1873) 114 Mass. 149.
' Lowell v. Boston and Ry. (1839, Mass.) 23 Pick. 24; Robbins v. Chicago
City (1866, U. S.) 4 Wall. 657; City of Rochester v. Montgomery (1878) 72 N.
Y. 65; C. & N. W. Ry. v. Dunn (1882) 59 Iowa, 61g, 13 N. W. 722; Phoenix
Bridge Co. v. Creem (io5, 2d Dept.) lO2 App. Div. 354, 92 N. Y. Supp. 855,
aff'd. (io6) i8 N. Y. 580, 78 N. E. IIIO; Hart Township v. Noret (igi6) 191
Mich. 427, 158 N. W. 17; see Scott v. Curtis (19o9) 195 N. Y. 424, 88 N. E.
794; City of Des Moines v. Des Moines Water Co. (192o) 188 Iowa, 24, 175
N. W. 821; 4 Dillon, Municipal Corporations (5th ed. 1911) sec. 1728.
" Twenty-five years ago, it was stated that the rule of Merryweather v. Nixan
was not applicable to negligence cases. Reath, op. cit. supra note 4. The writer
seized upon the then recent case of Palmer v. Wick and Pultney-town S. S. Co.
[1894, H. L.] A. C. 318, which came up to the House of Lords from Scotland,
and rejected the rule in negligence cases. It was pointed out that only a few
of the English and American cases citing the rule had been cases of negligence.
In the meantime, however, the doctrine has been applied very generally to these
cases.
'For a discussion of the doctrine of the last clear chance see COmmENTS
(1920) 29 YALE LAW JouRNA1 , 896.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
neglected,18 but it is encouraging to note that a few recent cases recog-
nize that the ancient formula is a redundancy as applied to these negli-
gence cases.1 9 It is believed that the great majority of cases holding
"no indemnity" upon close inspection of the facts would turn out to be
cases in which upon well settled principles of negligence the plaintiff
tort feasor would be denied a right of action for injury to himself.20
Thus is the old rule kept alive by decisions which recite it, yet do not
depend upon it.
The cases involving true contribution present a somewhat different
problem, for in such cases, in words of the original rule, the plaintiff
admits that he is a "wrongdoer," and that he should bear a part of the
judgment debt paid to the third party. Even here, ways and means
have been'devised to assist some of these "wrongdoers." The cases
divide themselves into several groups. Where the plaintiff has acted
"wilfully" the principle of no contribution has been followed almost
consistently.21 And so, where acts constituted fraud,22 publication of
libel," selling of intoxicants to an habitual drunkard,24 allowing a vicious
ram to run loose, 25 contribution has been denied. But even in this class
of cases there have been occasional lapses.2 6
'Nashua Iron Co. v. Worcester Ry. (1882) 62 N. H. 159. But see comment
that this case was at one time "anomalous." Bohlen, Contributory Negligence
(19o8) 21 HARv. L. REv. 233. It is suggested that the case is no longer anoma-
lous. See note i.
"B. and M. Ry. v. Brackett (19o2) 71 N. H. 494, 53 AtL 304; Hudson Valley
Ry. v. Mechanicville Elec. Light and Gas Co. (1917, 3d Dept.) i8o App. Div. 86,
167 N. Y. Supp. 428.; Knippenberg v. Lord & Taylor (1920, 1st Dept) 193 App.
Div. 753, 184 N. Y. Supp. 785; (1921) 30 YALE LAw JouRNAL, 527; Colo. and
So. Ry. West Light and Power Co. (1923) 73 Colo. 107, 214 Pac. 3o.
Union Stock Yards Co. v. Ry. (1905) 196 U. S. 217, 25 Sup. Ct. 226;
Larkin Co. v. Terminal Warehouse Co. (1914, 1st Dept.) 161 App. Div. 262, 146
N. Y. Supp. 38o; see cases holding "no contribution," infra note 32.
SWoodward, op. cit. supra note 7 sec. 256; Keener. op. cit. supra note 7, at
p. 408.
'Peck v. Ellis (1816, N. Y.) 2 Johns. C. 131; Miller v. Fenton (1844, N. Y.)
ii Paige, 18; Davis v. Gelhavs (1886) 44 Ohio St. 69, 4 N. E. 593; Boyer v.
Bolender (1899) 129 Pa. 324, 18 Atl. 127;.Fakes.v. Price (19o7) 18 Okla. 413,
89 Pac. 1123.
"See Arnold v. Clifford (1835, C.C.A. R. I.) 2 Sumner, 238; Atkins v.
Johnson (1870) 43 Vt. 78. In" both of these cases there was an express tontract
of indemnity. The court refused to enforce the contract and stated that neither
indemnity nor contribution could be had in such a case.
"Johnson v. Torpy (1892) 35 Neb. '6o4, 53 N. W. 575.
"Spaulding v. Oakes (1869) 42 Vt. 343. This was probably a case of negli-
gence rather than the commission of a "wilful" wrong, but the court treats it as
if it were "wilful," the parties knowing the vicious traits of the ram.
' See Kolb v. National Surety Co. (19o3) 176 N. Y. 233, 68 N. E. 247. This
was originally a case of malicious prosecution. One of the guilty parties allowed
his appeal bondsman to pay the entire judgment. Though other facts assisted
the court in its decision, a strong dictum indicated that the fact that a surety had
paid the judgment would alone release the case from the restriction of the general
rule, and allow the surety recovery against the other wrongdoer. This doctrine is
apparently peculiar to New York. It has also been applied to negligence cases,
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At this point Lord Kenyon's rule again gives way to other principles
of law. Where one of several partners has paid a judgment recovered
against all for the tort of a servant, he may have contribution from the
other partners.'7 The same applies as between creditors who by mis-
take or negligence have instructed a sheriff to levy on property which
does not belong to their debtor.28  These cases, and the first group of
indemnity cases mentioned above are governed by the same principle-
respondeat superior.
If the tort feasors are all charged with certain continuing duties, and
the injury results from an omission to act on the part of all of the tort
feasors, contribution may be had. Two counties were jointly respon-
sible for the upkeep of a bridge, and it was held that one might .have
contribution from the other when an injury resulted from their negli-
gence in failing to repair.29  Two adjoining landowners who jointly
build a wall which collapses and injures another may have contribution. 0
Officers of a corporation who neglect to file reports according to statute,
and afterwards are held responsible to creditors, will be required to
contribute to one officer who has paid the entire amount.,,
It has already been pointed out that as between two negligent tort
feasors, the plaintiff may have indemnity where the defendant alone had
the last clear chance to avoid. Conversely, where the plaintiff had the
and actually forced contribution, where otherwise there could have been none.
Rosenthal v. N. Y. Rys. (igig, Sup. Ct. Spec. T.) 1O9 Misc. 5, I79 N. Y. Supp.
593; City of White Plains v. Ellis (i22, Sup. Ct. Spec. T.) 113 Misc. 210, IQ4
N. Y. Supp. 444. In the latter case the effect was to force the City of White
Plains to contribute, whereas under the well settled rule in New York and else-
where, supra note i, the city was probably entitled to indemnity! (1921) 21
CoL. L. REv. 292. Fakes v. Price, supra note 22, is another anomalous case where
contribution for damages paid to a third party was refused, but contribution for
the costs of the trial allowed.
" 'We must look for personal participation, personal culpability, and personal
knowledge. If we do not find these circumstances, but perceive only a liability in
the eye of the law. the maxim of law that there is no contribution among wrong-
doers is not to be applied." Bailey v. Bussing, supra note 7, at p. 459, a leading
American case cited for nearly every phase of the subject of contribution between
joint tort feasors. Wooley v. Batte (1826, N. P.) 2 Car. & P. 417; Horback v.
Elder (1851) x8 Pa. 33; Hobbs v. Hutrley (1918) 117 Me. 449, 104 AtI. 815.
'Farwell v. Becker (1889) 129 Ill. 261, 21 N. E. 792; Selz v. Unna (1867,
U. S.) 6 Wall. 327; Vandiver v. Pollack (1895) l07 Ala. 547, 19 So. 18o; First
Nat. Bank of Pawnee v. Avery Planter Co. (19o3) 69 Neb. 329, 95 N. W. 622;
see Aclheson v. Miller (1853) 2 Ohio St. 203; contra: Wele v. Haviland (1872,
N. Y. C. P.) 42 How. Prac. 399 (apparently on the theory that the command to
the sheriff made the act of the creditors a "wilful" act).
Armstrong County v. Clarion County (287o) 66 Pa. 218.
S" .... that rule of Merryweather v. Nixan is applicable only where the person
seeking contribution was guilty of an intentional wrong, or at least, where he
must be presumed to have known that he was doing an illegal act." Ankeny v.
Moffett (887) 37 Minn. 109, 33 N. W. 320.
'Nickerson v. Wheeler (875) 118 Mass. 295; contra: Andrews v. Murray
(I86i, N. Y.) 33 Barb. 354 (seemingly overlooking the fact that there is a
difference between neglecting to file a report, and filing a false report). A some-
what similar case allowed contribution. Smith v. Ayrault (1888) 71 Mich. 475.
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sole last chance it would seem that neither indemnity nor contribution
should be allowed. There remain for consideration those cases where
it is not proved that either the plaintiff or the defendant had the last
chance. In such cases the plaintiff is guilty of contributory negligence,
and therefore cannot recover against the defendant tort feasor for his
own injuries. If we are to deny him also the right to contribution for
the injury to the third party, it would seem that.the real ground is in
the same rule of contributory negligence,3 2 and that the emaciated rule
of Merryweather v. Nixan is again superfluous to the decisions. On
the other hand if, as has been suggested by some, public policy recom-
mends that contribution be-not denied-but allowed in such cases,"'
the retention of the old "no contribution" rule unnecessarily beclouds
the real issue which is between the rule of contributory negligence and
the public policy of an increasingly complex civilization.34
The "exceptions" to the original pronouncement are based upon well
settled principles of law. The cases refusing indemnity or contribution
in negligence cases are really supported by fundamental principles of
the law of negligence. The "rule" of Merryweather v. Nixan not only
is not a rule, but it is a totally inadequate and confusing description of
the decisions professing to uphold it. The recurrent attacks of text-
writers and periodical contributors has failed to argue it out of the law.
If for no other reason than efficiency in preparing and deciding cases,
it is believed that the "principle" in its present form should be read out
of the law. By the weight of modern authority a joint tort feasor may
have indemnity or contribution, as the circumstances may require, in all
cases except (I) when his tort was "wilfully" committed, or, in cases
of mutual negligence, (2) when he alone had the last chance to avoid,
or (3) when it has not been proved that any one of the tort feasors had
the last clear chance. There is good reason to hope that the courts will
tend to allow contribution in the third group of cases.3 5
JUDICIAL ENCROACHMENT ON STATUTES OF LIMITATION
A recent New York case, Brush v. Lindsay (2d Dept. 1924) 210
App. Div. 361, 206 N. Y. Supp. 304, has opened the field of conjecture
See City of Tacomz v. Boniell (1911) 65 Wash. 505, 118 Pac. 642; Owens-
boro City Ry. v. Louisville St. L. Ry. (1915, Ky.) 178 S. W. io43; Adams v.
White Bits Line (1921) 184 Calif. 71O, 195 Pac. 389; cases cited stepra notes i8,
19, 20.
'Palmer v. Wick & Puitey-town S. S. Co., supra note 16; Ellis v. Chicago
and N. W. Ry. (1918) "167 Wis. 392, 167 N. W. 1048.
34Reath, op. cit. sapra note 4, at p. 193; NoTEs (1914) I VA. L. REV. 313.
Missouri, by statute, permits contribution between negligent tort feasors in some
cases. Mo. Rev. Sts. 1909, sec. 5431; Eaton v. Miss. Valley Trust Co. (i9o6)
x23 Mo. App. 117, 100 S. W. 551. Unless refusal of contribution in such cases
acts as a deterrent, which may be doubted, it is perhaps fair to allow contribution
between negligent tort feasors as to injuries to third parties, while leaving them
as they are as between themselves.
'Supra notes 29, 30, 31, 33, 34.
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on an interesting problem which the court presented but declined to
answer. The defendants, who were physicians, swore out alleged false
affidavits indicating that the plaintiff was insane, and further stated that
to serve notice on her would merely tend to aggravate her condition.
In reliance on these statements the plaintiff was committed to an asylum
without being extended an opportunity to have her mental condition
examined in court. Ten years later a nurse in the hospital instituted
habeas corpus proceedings and the plaintiff was released. In an action
of false imprisonment the defendant set up as a bar the two-year statute
of limitations.1 The lower court dismissed the complaint, and the
Appellate Division, in reversing, declared that since the false imprison-
ment was a continuing one, the right of action was not totally barred,
but that the plaintiff could recover damages for the last two years. The
court refused to venture an opinion as to whether the plaintiff could
recover for the first eight years, intimating, however, that she could not.
Assuming the action of false imprisonment to have been well brought,2
the intimation is not without precedent among the older cases,3 although
there is no indication that they exerted any influence in this instance;
and they seem to be generally disregarded in most modern decisions of
a kindred nature.
Early in the history of England certain notable events4 were desig-
nated, by reference to which actions not brought within a certain period
were customarily barred, the object being to penalize negligent parties
who had slept upon their rights and to quiet otherwise interminable
litigation. ' With the lapse of time, however, 'the points of reference
IN. Y. C. P. A. 1920, sec. 50.
2 By the general rule when a valid judgment intervenes between the defendant's
wrongful act and the actual imprisonment, the action must be framed in malicious
prosecution rather than false imprisonment Lock v. Ashton (1848) 12 Q. B.
871; Ayers v. Russell (1888, Sup. Ct. 3d Dept) 5o Hun, 282, 3 N. Y. Supp. 338;
Gearity v. Strasbourger (i9op, zst Dept.) 133 App. Div. 701, 1S N. Y. Supp.
257; Burdick, Law of Torts (3d ed. 1913) see. 292; Salmond, Law of Torts
(5th ed. 392o) 397; contra: Hurlehy v. Martine (i8go, Sup. Ct. 3d Dept.) 56
Hun, 648, io N. Y. Supp. 92. The distinction has received added weight in a
famous statement by Willes, J. in Austin v. Dowling (187o) L. R. 5 C. P. 534,
54o. For a discussion of the essential elements of both causes see Cooley,
Elements of Torts (1895) 5o; Burdick, op. cit. sec. 293; Winfield, Present Law
.of Abuse of Legal Procedure (1921) 174.
'Aldridge v. Duke (1687, K. B.) 3 Mod. iii; see Coventry v. Apsley (1692,
K. B.) 2 Salk. 42o; .cf. Massey v. Johnson (i8io, K. B.) 12 East, 67; Lightwood,
Time Limit on; Actions (19o9) 2O (although the cases cited there are not con-
clusive on the point).
" Such notable events as the beginning of the reign of Henry I, the return of
John from Ireland, the journey of Henry III into Normandy, and the coronation
of Richard I were used as points of reference in the limitation of actions.
Banning, Law of Limitation of Actions (3d ed. i9o6) I; cf. Coke, Littleton,
*II4b.
(3540) 32 Henry VIII, c. 2; see Cholmondeley v. Clinton (1820, CI.) 2 Jac.
& W. i, 34o; Tolson v. Kaye (1822, C. P.) 3 Bro. & B. 217, 223, 129 Eng. Rep.
1267, x269; Bell v. Morrison (1828, U. S.) x Pet. 351, 36o; Lewis v. Marshall
16
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became more uncertain and the resulting confusion greater. Conse-
quently there were passed the series of statutes beginning with thai of
(1540) 32 Henry VIII, c. 2,6 "so that by one constant law certain limi-
tations might serve both for the time present and for all time to come.
' 7
This statute, applying only to actions relating to real estate, was followed
three-quarters of a century later by the famous statute of (1623) 21
James I, c. 16, which extended the bar to actions personal as well as
real. This is the foundation of most modern American statutes of
limitation.8 In all of these enactments it was provided that certain
disabilities would prevent the statute from running when the person to
whom a right of action accrued was at the time within one of the groups
thus expressed. These disabilities were usually infancy, coverture,
non compos mentis, imprisonment and absence beyond the seas. They
have been in general reproduced in modern statutes, with the main
exception of imprisonment, expressly declared a disability in only about
one-half of the states.9
Courts of equity, which had from the moment of their inception
defended debtors harassed by claims grown stale through the laches of
persons entitled to sue, were not slow to adopt by analogy the limita-
tions imposed by the legislature on actions at law.10 With their greater
susceptibility to moral suasion, however, the chancellors did not consider
themselves strictly bound by the statutes and so developed the doctrine
of "concealed fraud"'1 in order to prevent the lapse of time from being
interposed by one who had obtained his legal advantage 12 "unconscion-
(1831, U. S.) 5 Pet. 470, 477; 1 Wood, Limitation of Actions (4th ed. 1916)
sec. 5. For a discussion of the history of the statutes of limitation see Buswell,
Limitations and Adverse Possession (1889) sec. 9; Angell, Limitation on Actions
at Law (5th ed. 1869). ch. i & 2; Brown, Law of Limitation as to Real Property
(I869) see. i.
"The most famous of these were the one mentioned and (1623) 2i James I, c.
16, sec. 7; (1705) 4 Anne, c. 16; (1853) 16 & 7 Vict. c. 113, sec. 2o; (1856)
19 & 20 Vict. c. 97.
7I Coke, Institutes, *95.
' Buswell, op. cit. supra note 5, sec. ii; i Wood; op. cit. supra note 5, sec. 2.
'The disabilities of imprisonment and absence beyond the seas contained in
previous statutes were repealed by (1856) 19 & 2o Vict., c. 97, sec. 1o. Where a
statute does not expressly declare imprisonment a bar to its application, courts
often refuse to so consider it. Bledsoe v. Stokes (1872, Tenn.) i Baxt. 312. For
a general discussion of disabilities under modern statutes see 2 Wood, op. cit..
supra note 5, ch. 22. The statutory disabilities in'New York may be found in
N. Y. C. P. A. 192o, sec. 6o.
"Angell, op. cit. supra note 5, ch. 3. For a discussion of this equitable evolu-
tion, see Delorahne v. Browne (1792, Ch.) 3 Bro. C. C. 519, 523, note; Bond v.
Hopkins (i8om, Ch.) i Sch. & Lef. 414, 428.
"tBooth, v. Earl of Warrington (1714, H. L.) 2 Eng. Rep. iii; see Deloraine v.
Browne, loc. cit. supra note 10; cf. Bicknell v. Gough (x747, CIL) 3 Atk. 558;
Roche v. O'Brien (i8o8, Ch.) i Ball & B. 330; Clerk & Lindsell, Torts (7th ed.
1921) I86; see also supra note Io.
"At law the mere fact of a plaintiff's inability to sue by reason of ignorance
of his cause of action would not prevent the statute from running. Imperial Gas
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ably." This doctrine received legislative recognition in the statute of
(1833) 3 & 4 William IV, c. 27, sec. 26, in which it was applied to
actions relating to land, and thenceforth, as might be expected, was sub-
ject to the most stringent application. One was required to bring his
case clearly within the statutory provision to receive the benefit of its
relief.1" Such was the uniform tendency in the treatment of all these
codified disabilities of equitable origin; and courts considered the statute
as a panacea by which all difficulties might be resolved, declaring them-
selves unable to consider as exceptions situations not expressly men-
tioned by the legislature. This view has apparently been adopted by
many of the courts of the United States.14
Despite this professed inability to go beyond the statutory exceptions
to extend relief to disabled parties, numerous situations appear where
the equitable influence has seemed to prevail in extending relief to claim-
ants who would otherwise be barred.15 These lend themselves to classi-
fication into what may be conveniently termed "factual inabilities" on
the one hand and "legal disabilities" on the other, both applying to
instances where one has been unable to bring his suit within the statu-
tory period.
Under the group denominated "factual inabilities" may be classed the
cases of "concealed fraud" alluded to above, where a cause of action
undeniably exists, but where the party who would otherwise sue thereon
is "factually" unable to do so by reason of his ignorance of its existence.
In such cases the statute does not begin to run until the plaintiff has, or
with the exercise of reasonable diligence, could have discovered the facts
Co. v. London Gas Co. (1854, Exch.) io Exch. 39 (defendant, unknown to the
plaintiff, bored into gas pipes and converted gas) ; Clerk & Lindsell, loc. cit. supra
note iI.
'Where the rightful ownership of lands of a plaintiff's ancestor was concealed
for a hundred years by mutilation of a marriage certificate forming the principal
link in the chain of title, no recovery was granted. Chetham v. Hoare (187o)
L. R. 9 Eq. 571, 577. So also where an action was brought seventy years after its
accrual, the court refused relief. Lawrance v. Norreys (i8go, H. L.) L. R. I5
A. C. 21o. See also Armstrong v. Milburn (1885, Q. B.) 54 L. T. R. (N. s.) 247;
Concealed Fraud (1880) :25 SoL. Jou. 147, 148.
" Kendall v. United States (1878) 14 Ct. of Claims 374; Ppwell v. Koehler
(1894) 52 Ohio St. 1O3, 39 N. E. I95; cf. Makepeace v. Bronnenburg (1896) 146
Ind. 243, 45 N. E. 336 (habitual drunkard not excepted) ; 2 Wood, op. cit. supra
note 5, sec. 252; Buswell, op. cit. supra note 5, sec. Io4. "It has never been
determined that the impossibility of bringing a case to a successful issue, from
causes of uncertain donation .... shall take such case out of the operation of the
act of limitations unless the legislature shall so declare its will." Marshall, C. J.
in Mclver v. Ragan (1817, U. S.) 2 Wheat. 25, 30.
. " The joinder of law and equity would seem to result in a more liberal view
toward defenses formerly available only in suits of an equitable nature, and to
countenance an application of the principles of "concealed fraud" in a class of
cases in which it was formerly denied. See Gibbs v. Guild (1882) L. R. 9 Q. B.
59, 66; Salmond, op. cit. supra note 2, at pp. 16o, 161 (especially in England). For
a discussion as to its application in American courts in actions formerly legal, see
(1895) 34 Ams. L. REo. (N. s.) 469, 470.
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constituting the cause of action.16  Under this denomination also may
fall the instances of duress,17 undue influence,' 8 and mistake.'9  Simi-
larly in the case of malpractice by a physician, the "factual inability" of
the patient has been held to delay the running of the statute until the
termination of the confidential relation and a discovery of the negli-
gence.20  This constitutes a noticeable exception to the rule normally
applied to negligently inflicted injuries.21 A further inclusion within
this group appears in the case of claims arising in favor of the estate of
a decedent, where it has been held that the statute does not begin to run
until the appointment of an administrator, as previously there was no
one in existence capable of suing.2 2  Several times have the courts been
called upon to consider slavery with respect to the statute of limitations;
and it seems to have been uniformly considered such a disability as
would prevent the statute from running. The courts have, however,
differed in their reasoning, some holding it imprisonment within the
statutory meaning,23 others considering it as an insuperable hindrance 4
" Supra note ii. See also Trevelyan v. Charter (2835) 4 L. J. CL (x. s.) 209;
43 SOL. JouR. (1899) 202, 203; (1895) 34 Am. L. REG. (x. s.) 464; Lightwood,
op. cit. supra note 3, at p. 297. "When the defendant has not only elected to
set up. the statute, but has previously by deception or by any violation of duty
toward the plaintiff, caused him to subject his claim to the statutory bar, he
must be charged with having wrongfully obtained an advantage which equity
will not allow him to hold." Stevenson, V. C., in Clark v. Augustine (igoi) 62
N. J. Eq. 689, 694, 51 At]. 68, 70.
'
TAllen v. Leflore County (190o) 78 Miss. 671, 29 So. 161; Howard v. Carter
(9o5) 71 Kan. 85, 8o Pac. 61 (statute does not begin to run until duress ceases).
" I11 the case of undue influence the statute has been held not to run during the
exercise of such influence. Oldham v. Oldhain (1859) 58 N. C. 89; Aldrich v.
Steen (904) 71 Neb. 33, 98 N. W. 445.
" In the case of mistake, as in those of fraud, duress and undue influence, the
statute does not begin to run until the actual discovery of the mistake or the time
when such discovery ought, with the exercise of reasonable diligence, to have been
discovered. Bacon v. Bacon (1967) 15O Calif. 477, 89 Pac. 317; Alexander v.
Owen County (2910) 136 Ky. 420, 124 S. W. 386; Jackson-Walker C. & M. Co.
v. Miller (2913) 88 Kan. 763, 129 Pac. 1170.
" Gillette v. Tucker (1go2) 67 Ohio St. io6, 65 N. E. 865; cf. Neil v. Flynn
Lumber Co. (1916) 78 W. Va. 235, 88 S. E. lo9o; see Drake, Rule of Law and
Legal Right (192o) i MIcH. L. Ra-v. 365, 373.
"In such cases the statute ordinarily begins to run on the accrual of the right
of action-the time when the injuries resulted from the negligent act. Fadden v.
Satterlee (i8go, C. C. S. D. Iowa) 43 Fed. 568; Burdick, op. cit. supra note 2,
sec. 273.
'Murray v. Easf India Co. (1821, K. B.) 5 B. & Ald. 204; Gunther v. Phila-
delphia & R. Ry. (1924, C. C. _A. 3d) i Fed. (2d) 85; Buswell, op. cit. supra
note 5, secs. 369, 370; Clerk & Lindsell, op. cit. supra note ii, at p. 184; (1925)
34 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 450. Where a debtor disappeared after the accrual of a
cause of action and there was no presumption of his death for five years thereafter,
the statute was suspended during the interval until the appointment of an adminis-
trator. Heckman v. Kassing (1921) 76 Ind. App. 4O, 132 N. E. 379.
'Mvitilda v. Crenshaw (1833, Tenn.) 4 Yerg. ,99; Price v. Slaughter (1871)
x Cinc. Super. Ct 429.
"Berry v. Berry's Adinr. (1894) 15 Ky. L. Rep. 865, 22 S. W. 654.
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in the nature of a "factual inability," and still others recognizing the
aspect of "legal disability" in view of the consistent refusal of courts to
entertain slaves as suitors.
25
Chief among the situations in the class of "legal disabilities" are those
where the closure of courts by reason of war has precluded parties from
an opportunity to litigate their claims. The common law of England
recognized no such disability ;2' and its development presents an inter-
esting example of the liberal view which courts have gradually evolved
to grant relief where they believe it due.27  Other cases have arisen in
great variety where courts have considered themselves justified in refus-
ing to permit the interposition of the statutory bar against a suitor who
has been deprived of access to the courts by "paramount authority.1
2
Insolvency presents more examples, as the statute has been held to apply
neither against creditors of an insolvent during the pendency of bank-
ruptcy proceedings,2" nor against the creditor-cestuis of an insolvent
whose assets are in the hands of express trustees.30 A further applica-
tion of this classification may well include the cases of successive disa-
bility, where the English courts have held that the statute does not begin
to run until removal of the last impediment. 31
The authorities thus cast doubt on the often repeated statement that
"the courts are without authority to enlarge or change those [exceptions]
specified, or establish others, though in particular cases the ends of
'See Bland v. Dowling (1837, Md.) 9 Gill. & J. i9, 27; cf. Wood v. Ward
(1878, S. D. Ohio) Fed. Cas. nos. 17965, 17966.
'Prdeaux v. Webber (1657, C. P.) 1 Levinz, 31 (statute held to run against a
cause of action for false imprisonment even while courts were closed by the
usurpation of rebels); cf. Hall v. Wyborn (169o, K. B.) 2 Salk. 42o.
' Originally the statute was tolled only when the lines of war so intervened
between the parties as to make one an alien anemy. Hanger v. Abbott (1867,
U. S.) 6 Wall. 532; Brown v. Hiatts (1872, U. S.) 15 Wall. 177. Later, how-
ever, the statute was held not to run whenever the courts were closed by reason of
war, regardless of the status of the parties. For an interesting discussion of this
development see Gregory, Effect of War on the Operation of Statutes of Limita-
tio' (915) 28 HARV. L. REV. 673. For other cases on this point see Braun v.
Sanerwein (1869, U. S.) io Wall. 218, 222; U. S. v. Wiley (287o, U. S.) ii Wall.
5o8, 513; Wirtele v. Grand Lodge A. 0. U. W. (1923, Neb.) 196 N. W. 5o.
" Thus the statute was held not to run during the period when claims affecting
public lands were under advisement in the United States land office, which had
sole jurisdiction over such matters. St. Paul M. & M. Ry. v. Olson (19o2) 87
Minn. 117, 91 N. W. 294. Similarly where the charter of a town was repealed by
the state and the statutory period had elapsed before re-incorporation under a new
name, claims of bondholders of the original town were held not barred. Broad-
foot v. Fayetteville (1899) 124 N. C. 478, 32 S. E. 84 And since a foreign
ambassador is immune from civil responsibility during the period of his embassy,
the statute does not begin to run until the cessation of that status. Munsurus Bey
v. Gadban [1894, C. A.] 2 Q. B. 352.
'Munns v. Burn (1887) L. R. 35 Ch. Div. 266; Darby & Bosanquet, Statutes of
Limitation (2d ed. 1899) 51; 2 Wood, op. cit. supra note 5, sec. 253, g.
"Insolvent Estate of Conrad Leiman (1869) 32 Md. 225, 243.
'Darby & Bosanquet, op. cit. supra note 29, at p. 61. It appears that in America
a contrary view prevails. Angell, op. cit. supra note 5, at p. 479.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
justice would seem to be subserved if it were done."3 2  There plainly
exists in the minds of many tribunals a distinct aversion to supporting
the statutory bar when the party against whom its protection is sought
has been unable to prevent its perfection. The same attitude is well
exemplified in the evasion by the courts of the strict application of the
doctrine of prescription. The historical basis of acquisition of rights
by prescription lay in the presumption of a lost grant, presumed from
the apparent acquiescence of the servient owner in permitting the con-
tinuance of the burden upon his land. But without his ability
("factual" or "legal") to terminate the wrongful user, the presumptive
acquiescence failed, and no prescriptive right could in general be
acquired. 3 The same sympathy for a party unable to prevent the run-
ning of the statutory period against his claim may have actuated the
court in Brush v. Lindsay to declare that since the imprisonment was a
continuing one,34 recovery might be had for the the last two years.85
But even if we grant that the imprisonment was a continuing one, the
' See Powell v. Koehler, op. cit. supra note 14, at p. ii9, 39 N. E. at p. I96.
"Chasemore v. Richards (1859) 7 H. L. 349 (no prescriptive right can
be obtained to underground percolating waters) ; Webb v. Bird (1863) 13 C. B.
(x. s.) 841; Carson, Prescription and Custom (19o7) Ii. ". . . but I cannot.
imagine any case of acquiescence in which there is not shown to be in the servietr,
owner: i, a knowledge of the acts' done; 2, a power in him to stop the acts or to
sue in respect of them; and 3, an abstinence on his part from the exercise of such
power." Fry, J. in Dalton v. Angus (i88i, H. L.) L. R. 6 A. C. 74o, 774.
Despite the general applicability of this view, the easement of "ancient lights"
in England forms a noticeable exception. Gale, Easements (gth ed. 1916) CI. 2.
The recognition of such easements when in fact the servient owner was incapable
of preventing their perfection probably was actuated by a desire to maintain as
much light and air in crowded districts as possible during the European plagues.
In America, with no such problem to be met, the courts have strictly applied the
rules of prescription, and have generally repudiated the doctrine of "ancient
lights." The leading case on the American view is Parker v. Foote (1838, N. Y.
Sup. Ct) i Wend. 3o9. For a discussion of the doctrine of "ancient lights" in
England and America see Washburn, Easements & Servitudes (4th ed. 1885) ch.
4, sec. 6.
"A number of authorities have adopted the view that a false imprisonment
constitutes a "continuing trespass." Huggins v,. Toler (1866, Ky.) i Bush, 192;
Shugart v. Cruise (1919, C. C. A. 4th) 26o Fed. 36; see Ruffner v. Williams
(1869) 3 W. Va. 243, 245; cf. Leland v. Marsh (182o) 16 Mass. 389, 391; Clerk
& Lindsell, op. cit. supra note ii, at p. 183; Darby & Bosanquet, op. cit. supra
note 29, at p. 45. This rule appears to be sanctioned by several old English cases.
Hardy v. Ryle (1829, K. B.) 9 B. & C. 6o3, 608; cf. Bailey v. Warden (1815,
K. B.) 4 M. & S. 4oo; see also supra note 3. It is to be observed, however, that
where the theory was applied in those cases it was to grant an entire right of
action which would otherwise have been barred. It is submitted that the doctrine,
if to be applied at all, should be limited to the situations of its origin-actions
concerning land. See Darley Main Colliery Co. v. Mitchell (1886, H. L.) L. R.
ii A. C. 127, I44; Kansas Pacific Ry. v. Mihlman (1876) 17 Kan. 224, 230 et seq.;
(1924) 33 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 557.
'At p. 367, 2o6 N. Y. Supp. at p. 3o9.
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plaintiff was so manifestly deprived of her ability to resort to the courts
during that period (whether such be a "factual inability" or a "legal
disability" growing out of the court's refusal to entertain a claim for
damages until vacation of the original commitment order), that the case
would seem to present a perfect plea for the judicial interference which
has been extended in cases no more "unconscionable." The adoption
of such a view will result in extending the plaintiff a recovery for the
whole ten years rather than for the last two only. But it seems that
the court could have granted relief for the entire period of imprisonment
without adopting the fictional theory of a continuing trespass.3 6 The
commitment of the plaintiff at the defendant's instance may be regarded
as the sole cause of action.37 The subsequent continuance of this deten-
tion is therefore viewed as merely an aggravated consequence of the
wrongful act, having its effect on the measure of damages 8 only and
giving rise to no new rights of action each day it continued. The stat-
ute should begin to run against this entire cause of action only on
removal of the disability.
3 9
It seems that the court was unduly cautious in its intimation that the
plaintiff could recover for only the last two years. A declaration that
the plaintiff could recover for the entire period of imprisonment would
have found support in precedent. 40
" As a normal rule of torts a right of action accrues on the occurrence of an
act unlawful in itself. Raynor v. Mintzer (1887) 72 Calif. 585, I8 Pac. 82; see
Kansas Pacific Ry. v. Mihlman, loc. cit. supra note 34; Burdick, op. cit. supra
note 5, sec. 273. And the statute starts to run on the accrual of the right of action.
This is aptly illustrated by the case of seduction, where the right of action arises
immediately on the unlawful act, and subsequent consequences are considered only
as affecting the measure of damages. Dunlap v. Linton (i8gi) 144 Pa. 335, 22
Atd. 8ig; cf. Rockwell v. Day (i918) ioi Wash. 580, 172 Pac. 754.
""Cause of action" is used throughout this discussion to denote the operative
facts which give rise to the plaintiff's "right of action"-a distinction stressed by
several pleading authorities. Clark, The Code Cause of Action (1924) 33 YALE
LAw JoURNAL, 817.
'In the absence of malice in false imprisonment damages are granted for the
injuries actually sustained as a result of the acts on which the right of action rests.
I & 2 Sedgwick, Damages (8th ed. i8gi) sec. 352, 372, 463; 3 Sutherland,
Damages (2d ed. 3893) sec. 3257; see Voltz v. Blackman (3876) 64 N. Y. 44o,
444; Salmond, op. cit. supra note 2, sec. 35. For a general discussion of damages
in false imprisonment, see i Joyce, Damages (903) ch. Ig.
'A number of cases have considered the right of action complete on the release
of the imprisoned party, the statute beginning to run at that time. Dsenbury v.
keiley (i88o, N. Y. C. P.) 8 Daly, 537, aff'd. (1881) 85 N. Y. 383; Hackler v.
Miller (9o7) 79 Neb. 206, 332 N. W. 303; Alexander v. Thompson (i932,
C. C. A. 6th) 195 Fed. 31; Lane v. Ball (1917) 83 Or. 4o4, i6o Pac. 144. It is
significant, however, that in none of these cases was the imprisonment continued
so long as to raise the problem of the instant case.
"' "The law of no free country can tolerate a condition of things under which
a person innocent of crime and threatening no injury to himself or others can be
restrained of his liberty and no person be responsible for the injury he suffers."
Cooley, J. in Van Deusen v. Newcomer (1879) 4o Mich. 9o, 134.
